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In this paper I assess Gopnik and M eltzoff’s developmental psychology o f science as 
a  contribution to  the understanding o f  scientific development. I focus on two specific 
aspects o f Gopnik and M eltzoff’s approach: the relation between their views and re­
capitulationist views o f  ontogeny and phylogeny in biology, and their overall concep­
tion o f  cognition as a set o f veridical processes. First, I discuss several issues that arise 
from their appeal to  evolutionary biology, focusing specifically on the role o f distinc­
tions between ontogeny and phylogeny when appealing to  biology for theoretical sup­
port. Second, I argue that to  presuppose that cognition is veridical o r “ truth-tropic” 
can compromise attem pts to  understand scientific cognition both throughout history 
and in the present. Finally, I briefly sketch an evolutionary approach to  understanding 
scientific development tha t contrasts with G opnik and M eltzoff’s.
1. Introduction. In the last fifteen years philosophy o f science has been 
transformed by the influence o f the cognitive sciences. Psychologists 
and other cognitive scientists offer methods and approaches that they 
believe will help address traditional problems in philosophy of science. 
Many philosophers welcome the interest and embrace the cognitive 
science approach (Giere 1988, Churchland 1989, Thagard 1988). The 
approach is often referred to as cognitive science o f science. Recently,
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developmental cognitive psychologists have offered their expertise in 
understanding scientific development. An adventurous defense o f the 
developmental psychology approach to understanding science is pre­
sented in a book by Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff (1997; hence­
forth GM) and in various papers by Gopnik (1996a, b, c).
My aim in this paper is to assess Gopnik and Meltzoff’s develop­
mental psychology of science as a contribution to the understanding 
o f scientific development. I do not present a comprehensive critique of 
Gopnik and Meltzoff below as many aspects o f Gopnik’s views have 
been criticized recently.1 Here I focus on just two specific aspects of 
Gopnik and Meltzoff’s approach: the relation between their views and 
recapitulationist views of ontogeny and phylogeny in biology, and their 
overall conception o f cognition as a set o f veridical processes. First, I 
discuss several interesting issues that arise from their appeal to evolu­
tionary biology. I focus specifically on the role of distinctions between 
ontogeny and phylogeny when appealing to biology for theoretical sup­
port. Second, I argue that presupposing cognition is veridical or “truth- 
tropic” can compromise attempts to understand scientific cognition 
both throughout history and in the present. This argument is made in 
two parts: the first examines an example from the history of science 
and the second discusses the role o f truth in evolutionary accounts of  
cognition. I also briefly sketch an alternative approach to understand­
ing scientific development that contrasts with Gopnik and M eltzoff’s. 
Although my approach is at odds with Gopnik and M eltzoff’s in some 
specific respects, I share several o f their concerns about currently ex­
isting accounts o f scientific development and I endorse some of their 
methodological directives. Specifically, I endorse their proposals to give 
precedence to individual scientist’s cognition and to present a type of  
evolutionary account o f scientific development. Throughout, I illus­
trate the extent to which cognitive scientists who present revisions to 
philosophy o f science share some key assumptions with mainstream 
philosophers o f science. Empirical investigations in the cognitive sci­
ences may force us to reconsider these key assumptions.
2. Developmental Psychology of Science: A Summary of the View.
Gopnik and Meltzoff’s view is that the processes underlying cognitive 
development in children and scientific development are similar or even 
identical. This is the case because both developmental processes involve
1. F or example, Miriam Solomon (1996) criticizes G opnik’s views on the social nature 
o f scientific practice; A rthur Fine (1996) focuses on her naive realism; and Stephen 
Stich and Shaun Nichols (1998) present a wide range o f criticisms o f Gopnik and Mel­
tzoff’s book.
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theory change: one theory is replaced by another largely due to over­
whelming evidence against the older theory and for the newer one. 
They refer to this view as the theory theory:
The central idea o f this theory is that the processes o f cognitive de­
velopment in children are similar to, perhaps even identical with, the 
processes o f cognitive development in scientists. Scientific theory 
change is, after all, one o f the clearest examples we know of the der­
ivation of genuinely new abstract and complex representations o f  
the world from experience. The model o f scientific change might be­
gin to lead to answers to the developmental questions.. . .  (GM, 3)
Many readers will find this definition o f the theory theory unfamiliar. 
The theory theory is usually referred to in debates over what represen­
tations underlie our common sense folk psychology (see, e.g., Carruth- 
ers and Smith 1996). In this literature, the theory theory is the view 
that underlying our folk psychology is a kind of theory. A  similar claim 
is made about our folk physics, our everyday inferences about middle- 
size objects, which depend on a kind of theory. Neither o f these un­
derlying theories need be much like scientific theories; they have been 
variously described as coherent sets o f beliefs or sets o f beliefs that 
ground predictions (Stich 1983; also cf. Churchland 1988).
Stich and Nichols (1998) have a felicitous phrase for Gopnik and 
Meltzoff’s view, they call it the “theory theory to the max.” Gopnik 
and Meltzoff hold that the theories underlying children’s understand­
ing o f minds and everyday objects are just like scientific theories. Gop­
nik (1996c) has a less exciting name for the view, the theory-formation 
theory. I will use her terminology throughout so as to dissociate her 
view from that o f milder theory theory proponents.
Scientists and philosophers o f science have reached no consensus 
over just exactly what scientific theories are and Gopnik and Meltzoff 
acknowledge this point. As a result they propose an account o f theories 
that is as “mainstream and middle-of-the-road as possible.” Their main 
aim is to present theories as “direct candidates for psychologically real 
representations and rules” (GM, 33). As a result they are not inclined 
to consider philosophical debates over the nature o f theories. They 
claim that such philosophical debates are largely beside the point con­
cerning issues o f logic rather than psychology.2
Gopnik and Meltzoff share the rejection o f entirely logically- 
oriented approaches to theories with many contemporary philosophers 
of science. This is not surprising as the move was initiated among phi­
losophers as a result o f interest in cognitive psychology. Ron Giere
2. This is a  debatable point that I do not take up here.
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(1988) and Philip Kitcher (1993) present alternative views o f scientific 
theories that are intended to be more psychologically realistic. What 
Gopnik and Meltzoff argue they add to these approaches is an em­
phasis on the “dynamic” aspects o f theories such as theory change and 
theory formation. But much of the story they present here is also fa­
miliar in philosophy o f science. On Gopnik and MeltzofTs account, 
theories are confronted with counterevidence; theorists initially ignore 
this; the counterevidence mounts and a new theory that copes better 
with the evidence supersedes the original theory. Their interesting 
move, that departs from most contemporary philosophy of science, is 
that this familiar presentation of the dynamic features of scientific the­
ories also characterizes cognitive development in children. On this view, 
very young children, even 42-minute-old babies, have theories that they 
revise in the face o f new evidence, base experiments on, and subse­
quently reject in favor o f new theories.
Before turning to the discussion o f the theory-formation theory, I 
should lay out Gopnik and M eltzoff’s conception of cognition, because 
it is crucial for an understanding of their overall views on scientific 
development. Their view is that “cognition is about how minds arrive 
at veridical conceptions o f the world” (GM, 15). And further:
The assumption o f cognitive science is that human beings are en­
dowed by evolution with a wide variety o f devices—some quite 
substantive and domain-specific, others much more general and 
multi-purpose—that enable us to arrive at a roughly veridical view 
of the world. Usually in cognitive science we think o f these devices 
in terms o f representations o f the world and rules that operate on 
those representations. (GM, 15)
This view is put more starkly by Gopnik as follows: “A cognitive sci­
entist would say that evolution constructed truth-finding cognitive pro­
cesses” (1996a, 489). Now we can see the connection between cognition 
and science:
Science employs a particularly powerful and flexible set of these 
cognitive abilities. Science uses a set o f representations and rules 
that are particularly well-suited to uncovering the truth about the 
world. Science gets it right because it uses psychological devices 
that were designed by evolution precisely to get things right. 
(1996a, 489)
This view of cognition and science can now be tied in with the story 
about cognitive development. The theory-formation theory proposes 
that the cognitive processes in science are similar to those that guide 
children’s development because these processes were designed by evo­
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lution “to allow human children to learn.” Science and human babies 
both use the same truth-gaining processes. In the following two sections 
I discuss some aspects of this view in more detail.
3. Ontogenetic and Phylogenetic Theories of Development. In this 
section I provide some definitions. In biology, ontogeny is “the life 
history o f an individual, both embryonic and post-natal” (Gould 1977, 
483) and phylogeny is “the evolutionary history o f a lineage, conven­
tionally (though not ideally) depicted as a sequence o f adult stages” 
(Gould, 484). Biologists provide very different accounts o f ontogenetic 
and phylogenetic development. One issue that, even otherwise warring, 
biologists agree upon is that many relations between ontogeny and 
phylogeny are still mysterious.
In the nineteenth century, many biologists believed that ontogeny re­
capitulates phylogeny—individual organismal development passes 
through the stages o f the phylogenetic history o f the organism—and 
Haeckel, the most famous proponent o f this view, held that one under­
lying mechanism explained both processes (Gould 1977,78). Now it is 
largely agreed that phylogeny is accounted for by the random processes 
of mutation and recombination, which produce variation, which is in 
turn acted upon by selection. The standard micro-evolutionary expla­
nation also includes genetic drift and other factors.3 Ontogeny is ac­
counted for by the immensely complex interactions of genes, organism, 
and environment that contribute to the development o f individual or­
ganisms. Although there is a great deal of progress in evolutionary de­
velopmental biology, there is no standard picture such as the micro-evo­
lutionary model. One thing is agreed upon: recapitulationism is false.
4. Ontogeny and Phylogeny in Scientific Development. Gopnik and 
M eltzoff’s theory-formation theory refers to three developmental pro­
cesses: children’s cognitive development, scientists’ cognitive develop­
ment, and the development o f science. Let me first clarify why I believe 
these three are separable. Scientists and science are not the same. Sci­
ence has a history that consists o f the practices and achievements o f  
scientists. So scientific development is not the same as scientists’ de­
velopment. Prima facie, children and scientists are likely to have dif­
ferent cognitive processes.4 Once we grant these processes are separa­
3. This is an oversimplification even o f the standard story. F or the purposes o f this 
paper I simply assume that microbiology unambiguously accounts for macrobiological 
phenomena such as phylogeny. F or this view see Futuym a 1986; for a m ore develop­
m en ta l^  oriented view see G erhart and Kirschner 1997.
4. Gopnik and M eltzoff provide a good discussion o f why we should resist this prima 
facie judgm ent. I tackle this issue briefly below.
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ble, there are several relations that could hold between them. Gopnik 
and Meltzoff suggest that all o f the following relations hold at different 
places throughout their work. The theses that express these relations 
do explanatory work for Gopnik and Meltzoff and are as follows:
(a) Children’s development is identical to scientific development.
(a') Children’s development is similar to scientific development.
(b) Children’s development is identical to scientists’ develop­
ment.
(b') Children’s development is similar to scientists’ development.
(c) Scientific development is a model for children’s development.
(d) Scientific development is analogous with children’s develop­
ment.
(e) Science and children use the same cognitive processes.
(f) Scientists and children use the same cognitive processes.
A quick glance at the theses reveals that some make different explan­
atory claims than others. Rather than taking up all o f these particular 
differences, I focus on the general considerations that lay behind them. 
First, I will clear up a few ambiguities that arise from my expression 
o f Gopnik and Meltzoff’s views in the form of the above theses.
I said above that, prima facie, scientists and children have different 
cognitive processes. This claim is based on the fact that scientists are 
adults and are likely to have learned a great deal since they were chil­
dren, for instance, how to solve differential equations. The issue turns 
on whether there can be an empirical demonstration that distinguishes 
between the application o f a particular cognitive process in different 
situations or contexts and the application of different cognitive pro­
cesses. I have a view of cognition as mental processing o f all kinds, 
including visual processing, language comprehension and production, 
doing calculus, solving everyday problems and solving disciplinary spe­
cific scientific problems. So for example, on my view, there may be two 
distinct cognitive processes involved in the apprehension o f an attrac­
tive geometrical shape and the comprehension o f a graph, even though 
both processes are clearly driven by some application of the visual 
system. The relation articulated in thesis (f) above is therefore one that 
is open to further empirical scrutiny on my view. There is also a con­
ceptual point at stake here, which is the general problem of the differ­
entiation o f cognitive processes. The extent to which “the same” pro­
cess is used in various situations can be interpreted in several ways. My 
take on this is that individuals can share elements o f visual processing 
and lack other cognitive processes that are dependent on visual pro­
cessing. This approach implies a fineness o f grain in distinguishing cog­
nitive processes that is not generally accepted in cognitive science. In
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contrast one might say that cognitive processes are more coarse­
grained, consisting in such things as processing complex visual images, 
mental modeling, or schema induction. But this discussion leads away 
from the specific issue o f this paper.5
A further ambiguity is presented in my thesis (e). Thesis (e) could 
imply a mistaken comparison of science, which is a body of knowledge, 
and children, who are knowledge developers. In other words I am foist­
ing a mismatch of process and product on Gopnik and Meltzoff in 
claiming that they hold thesis (e). One way of adjusting for this could 
be to restate (e) as (e'). Scientific knowledge and the knowledge children 
acquire during development are produced using the same cognitive 
processes. This restatement still seems problematic by my lights. 
Briefly, scientific knowledge, considered as a product, is a somewhat 
abstract concept that refers to more or less all the results o f successful 
scientific practice over time. This concept is not easily accommodated 
into the model o f the results o f any individual’s knowledge acquisition. 
(See Bishop and Downes for more on this point.)
Now let us return to more general considerations that underlie the 
above theses. If we refer to our definitions from biology, we can see 
that children’s and scientists’ development are instances o f ontogenetic 
processes, where science more closely resembles a phylogenetic process. 
Each of the individuals involved in science has an individual develop­
mental history and the history o f science records, among other things, 
the cognitive products o f these individuals. This claim that individual 
scientist’s development correlates with ontogeny and the history of sci­
ence with phylogeny is made in numerous places (see, e.g., Campbell 
1982, and Toulmin 1981).
Gopnik and Meltzoff also appeal to analogies with biological de­
velopment to support their view (see also Gopnik 1996a). They appeal 
to horticulture to provide complex analogical support for their posi­
tion. If this appeal is to provide support for their position, we need to 
examine it carefully. I intend to do so guided by the distinctions intro­
duced above from biology.
Gopnik and Meltzoff begin by introducing the work o f horticultur- 
alists who take basic mechanisms of species change and put them to work 
to serve particular cultural ends, producing flowers that fit with partic­
ular cultural conceptions o f how flowers should look. They then draw
5. This paragraph and the one following were developed in response to some helpful 
comments by an anonym ous referee. As my discussion indicates, the investigation of 
scientific cognition reopens numerous theoretical debates in cognitive science generally, 
and Gopnik and M eltzoff and other developmental psychologists point to  fruitful ways 
o f  approaching these debates.
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the analogy that science takes particular “natural mechanisms o f con­
ceptual change” and puts them to use in a particular way (GM, 21). So 
the way we should understand the scientific case is by reference to the 
more familiar biological case. A close look at the relevant biology reveals 
some interesting difficulties with the application of their analogies.
Artificial selection in breeding is the model Darwin took for natural 
selection. Darwin’s view was that the production o f variation through 
artificial hybridization experiments was an artificial version of nature’s 
own hybridization experiments. Both situations involve accounting for 
phylogeny. We account for speciation in terms of natural selection 
working on naturally produced variation and we account for hybrid­
ization in terms o f artificial selection. So Gopnik and Meltzoff are 
correct to say that “the basic facts of mutation, inheritance, and selec­
tion are the same [in plant breeding and natural plant speciation] and 
at a deeper level, it is these facts that explain why the flowers have the 
traits they do” (GM, 21). However, Darwin did not take artificial se­
lection or natural selection to directly explain facts about individual 
development. As I outlined above, basic facts about mutation, selec­
tion, and so on, account for why organisms have the traits they do in 
successive generations, but different explanatory mechanisms are re­
quired to account for the production of those traits in any one partic­
ular organism in a particular generation. Mendel and Darwin did in­
deed recognize common underlying natural mechanisms to natural and 
artificial selection but they did not claim that these same mechanisms 
explained individual development. So Gopnik and M eltzoff’s exten­
sion of the analogy to make a point about scientific development is 
undermined by the conflation of ontogeny and phylogeny. If I am right 
that children’s development is an ontogenetic process and scientific de­
velopment is a phylogenetic one, then Gopnik and Meltzoff can un- 
controversially compare artificial and natural selection, but not chil­
dren’s’ development and scientific development.
What I have said so far here hinges on analogies or disanalogies 
with biology. Gopnik and M eltzoff’s appeal to the above analogy in 
support o f their view makes them look like recapitulationists. They 
appear to believe that one mechanism explains both ontogeny and phy­
logeny, as did Haeckel. Of course it could still be argued that although 
recapitulationism is false in biology, there could be a recapitulationist 
relation between children’s and scientific development for completely 
independent reasons. My view is that if this is the reply, then biology 
should have been left out of the picture altogether. If biology is invoked 
to defend the view, I believe that ontogeny and phylogeny should be 
kept straight and Gopnik and Meltzoff should make it clear that they 
understand that recapitulationism is not available as a resource from
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contemporary biology. If biology is to be left out o f the picture, then 
there must be independent grounds for a recapitulationist account o f  
children’s development. I turn to this issue now.
Gopnik claims (pers. comm.) that she starts from the empirical ob­
servation that children’s development and scientific development are 
similar processes. But this is not an uncontroversial empirical obser­
vation, as many observers o f scientific development fail to make the 
same observation as Gopnik. Once the similarity has been observed, 
the account goes, a mechanism must be provided to explain it. It is at 
this point that there are difficulties with Gopnik and Meltzoff’s view. 
The similarity claim is not so much an empirical observation but a 
specific theory-laden point. It appears that rather than discovering a 
mechanism underlying two similar processes, Gopnik and Meltzoff 
have viewed two different processes from one particular perspective.
As we saw earlier in the paper, Gopnik and Meltzoff rely on an 
idealized account o f scientific development as a procession o f theories 
confronting evidence. Scientific cognition, on this view, consists in the 
operations that produce this parade o f theories. Once we accept this 
view then it is easier to propose that children’s cognitive development 
is similar to scientific development. Rather than contributing an em­
pirically-based account o f scientific development derived from devel­
opmental psychology, Gopnik and Meltzoff appear to superimpose a 
standard philosophical view about scientific development and theory 
change on children’s cognitive development. Rather than discovering 
a “mechanism” that is common to two processes, they superimpose an 
idealized view of one process, scientific development, onto empirical 
results revealed from studying the other, children’s development.
From the perspective advanced so far, the idea that scientific devel­
opment provides a model for studying children’s development is a re­
capitulationist idea. In nineteenth-century evolutionary biology, the 
fact that there were apparent overlapping stages in ontogeny and phy- 
logeny led people to look for a common mechanism for both processes. 
To view children’s development using the model o f scientific develop­
ment is also a recapitulationist move. The two processes are not the 
same; thesis e., that children and science use the same cognitive pro­
cesses, is not prima facie correct. Further, defending such a claim re­
quires more empirical support than any cognitive psychologists have 
yet provided.
In the final section I sketch a view of scientific development that is 
consistent with Gopnik and M eltzoff s aims in acknowledging the need 
for an account o f the role o f cognitive processes o f individual scientists. 
First, I turn to relations between scientific cognition, history o f science, 
and evolution.
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5. How Good Are Our Cognitive Processes? For Gopnik and Meltzoff, 
children or scientists getting things wrong is the unusual case. Children 
learn a correct picture o f the world and the objects around them and 
scientists get things right more often than not. This view derives from 
their belief, presented above, that cognition is a process, or set o f pro­
cesses, selected for by evolution to represent the world correctly. As I 
mentioned earlier, this view about cognition getting things right is in­
timately connected with the theory-formation theory, because, accord­
ing to Gopnik and Meltzoff, the cognitive processes that enable chil­
dren to be such cognitive overachievers are exactly those used by 
scientists. There are two components o f this view that demand further 
scrutiny: first, we can ask whether cognition and veridical or “truth- 
tropic” cognition are the same; and second, we will need to spell out 
and examine the claim that “truth-tropic” cognition has been selected 
for by evolution. Let us take these issues one at a time.
There is a tendency in much cognitive science to set out with the aim 
of producing a naturalistic or descriptive hypothesis and end up with 
a normative one. Rather than presenting hypotheses about actual men­
tal processing, we often present hypotheses about optimal mental pro­
cessing or how to be rational. Philosophers find this hard to avoid but 
there is no lack of arguments that warns against this tendency. An 
example o f this difficulty arises when accounting for the development 
o f science in terms o f individual scientists’ cognition. What I call the 
“Priestley problem” will help illustrate this point.
If we grossly oversimplify the history o f science, Joseph Priestley 
was wrong. He held the phlogiston theory o f combustion, rather than 
the oxygen theory, which we now know is correct. On the other hand 
most philosophers o f science would want to grant Priestley the recog­
nition o f being a good scientist. His cognitive practices were in many 
ways exemplary. He used the experimental method to great effect, be­
ing the first to isolate what he thought was de-phlogisticated air. How  
can he both be a good scientist and wrong?6 On Gopnik and Meltzoff’s 
view, getting it right is characteristic o f science. Does this mean that 
Priestley was dysfunctional and that he used bad cognitive processes? 
If this is the implication, then much of the history o f science has been 
produced by non-veridical cognitive processes. And on this view most 
important scientists have been cognitively defective in one way or 
other: Einstein did not believe the fundamental tenets o f quantum the­
6. Kitcher (1993,96-101) has a good discussion of Priestley that focuses more on aspects 
o f the reference o f  scientific terms, but reflects some o f my concerns here. Giere (1988) 
refers to  Priestley as one o f the history o f  science’s great “holdouts.”
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ory; Newton was wrong about motion at high speeds and the nature 
of gravity; Darwin was wrong about pangenes.
The claim that science characteristically gets things right may be 
correct as a statement about science, construed as the collection o f  
practices, combined throughout history to investigate the nature o f the 
world and the structure o f its laws. But it does not necessarily follow 
that the success o f science depends on individual scientists having truth- 
tropic cognitive abilities. If Gopnik and Meltzoff intend the claim that 
Priestley helped the whole process o f scientific investigation get closer 
to the truth, then this would be a claim about the process o f science 
and not Priestley’s individual contribution. This point illustrates the 
difference between theses (a) and (b) above.
This discussion leads to the more general question o f whether a cog­
nitive science o f science need presuppose that cognition is veridical or 
truth-tropic. One suggestion is that cognitive science o f science, con­
strued as the study o f individual scientists as cognitive agents, can rely 
on the more neutral view that cognition is mental processing. For ex­
ample, we could assume with Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996), among oth­
ers, that cognition is “a basic apparatus that makes possible perception, 
the formation of belief-like states, the interaction o f these states with 
motivational states such as needs and desires, and the production of 
behavior” (22). On this account, cognitive science would be the empir­
ical study o f just what that processing consists in and cognitive science 
of science the empirical study of the particular mental processes that 
are used in science. Then it is empirically contingent that apparently 
non-truth-tropic cognitive processes are instrumental in the discovery 
o f successful scientific theories. Miriam Solomon (1992) argues that 
there is at least one example o f the use of non-truth-tropic cognitive 
mechanisms in the history o f successful science in her discussion of the 
successful plate-tectonics revolution in geology.
Several o f the proponents o f this more neutral and pragmatic view 
o f cognition have also produced convincing arguments against the va­
lidity o f the second component o f Gopnik and MeltzofT’s view o f ve­
ridical cognition: that it was selected for by evolution.
Gopnik and Meltzoff clearly state that veridical cognition is selected 
for and also claim that this is an assumption of cognitive science. There 
are several arguments against this view.7 The upshot o f these discus­
sions is that truth is separable from cognitive success and that truth- 
tropic cognition is not likely to be selected for. Here is one such ar­
7. Stephen Stich (1990) presents some o f  them and Edward Stein (1996) reworks them 
with some additions. Godfrey-Smith (1996) provides a  useful discussion o f  the notion 
o f correspondence and its role in biologically based accounts o f cognition.
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gument against this particular selection process: An organism may 
represent either false positives or false negatives. For an omnivore in 
a “gastronomically heterogeneous environment” (Stich 1990,62), false 
positives are cheap. If you think that a certain food is poisonous and 
hence do not eat it, then you are fine. False negatives are costly; if you 
believe that the food is not poisonous and hence eat it, you could be 
poisoned and die. A  very cautious risk aversive strategy might be more 
fitness enhancing and hence selected for, despite being unreliable and 
prone to representing falsehoods. As Stich points out, “natural selec­
tion does not care about truth; it cares about reproductive success” 
and from this perspective “it is often better to be safe (and wrong) than 
sorry” (1990, 62). The take-home message here is that we can separate 
evolutionary issues from truth acquisition, while still discussing the 
biological role o f cognition. In my final section, I will briefly address 
the question of whether we can have a view of scientific development 
that contains an evolutionary component and attends to individual 
scientists’ cognition.
6. A Glimpse of an Alternative Approach to Scientific Development. 
Given that I argue against key components o f Gopnik and M eltzoff’s 
view of scientific development and have some reservations about their 
presuppositions about the nature and origin o f cognition, why have I 
claimed that I agree with some of their criticisms and that I endorse 
some o f their methods? Gopnik and Meltzoff are right in their view 
that understanding individual cognition is an important component of 
philosophy o f science. So I agree with their use of this point to motivate 
a rejection o f rational reconstructivist philosophy of science. But as I 
point out, while they claim that they reject a traditional philosophy of 
science approach, that approach comes back to haunt them. Their ac­
count may also be understood as an evolutionary approach to scientific 
development as they invoke evolution as a mechanism that produces 
the cognitive processes required for science. I have argued that some 
problems face this particular evolutionary approach. But this leaves 
the question o f whether some kind of an evolutionary account o f sci­
entific development may be correct. I now turn to this question.
Scientists are agents with varying cognitive capacities (cf. Giere 
1988, Stich 1990, Kitcher 1993), many o f which develop during late 
adolescence and adulthood. Later cognitive development is very much 
a product o f environment, such as scientific education and scientific 
culture. As I argued above, the fact that all humans have the basic 
capacity to process complex visual images does not mean we do not 
have to teach them to understand graphs. Even among the extremely 
small subset o f the world’s population who are professional scientists,
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there is a huge amount of cognitive diversity. This diversity ranges from 
variation in memory capacities to varying abilities at mathematics.
Chronicling scientific development is a post hoc procedure that col­
lects together scientists’ achievements as they are presented in journals 
and books and embodied in new instrumentation. There is no such 
thing as the development o f science per se, but there is the accumulation 
of instruments, theoretical techniques, experimental techniques and so 
on, which, in each of the specific areas for which they are designed, 
provide us with more predictive ability, control and information (cf. 
Kuhn 1970).
What is the relation between the stories about cognitive diversity 
among individual scientists and the development o f science? Along with 
Kitcher (1993, 71-72), I propose that this kind o f cognitive diversity is 
an important contributor to scientific development. If scientific devel­
opment is a kind o f evolutionary process, and I think at the present 
state o f our knowledge we can only claim that it is analogous to evo­
lution, then the process requires diversity or variation. Scientific de­
velopment is evolutionary only in the sense that it is moved along by 
operations on concepts, theories, images, instruments, and objects that 
are already available to scientists, rather than driven by some prede­
termined goal (cf. Kuhn 1970). The relevant operations are carried out 
by individuals with varied cognitive capacities. The result o f the process 
is the production o f new theories with varying successes at prediction 
and control. The relevant variation is in cognitive capacities o f indi­
vidual scientists and in instruments, concepts, and theories. The theo­
ries that are successful relative to scientific epistemic standards “sur­
vive” (cf. Kitcher 1993, Hull 1988).
My point in introducing this evolutionary approach to understand­
ing scientific development here is to give a sense o f an alternative pos­
sibility to a “literal” evolutionary model o f scientific development. Ed­
ward Stein uses the term “literal” (1996,206) to distinguish approaches 
that claim that science is a product o f evolution or directly caused by 
evolution. On Stein’s account, Gopnik and M eltzoffs view of scientific 
development is a literal evolutionary model as they claim that the truth- 
detection mechanisms used by scientists are selected for. In contrast 
with Gopnik and Meltzoff’s account, the view I have sketched here 
does not require that cognition is veridical and selected for as such. 
Further, the account pointed to here includes an important role for 
scientists as individual cognizers, but steers clear o f recapitulationism.
Problems confronting the cognitive science o f science will not be 
solved by working out the details o f evolutionary accounts of scientific 
development; rather they will be more productively confronted by ad­
vances in empirical studies o f cognition. Gopnik and Meltzoff, along
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with others, have forced us to acknowledge a role for developmental 
psychology in this enterprise. One promising area for further empirical 
study will involve spelling out the details o f the claim that adults and 
children use the same cognitive processes.
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